followers, the fifth.

[1] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[2] Diog. IV. 6, 33.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 234.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 220.

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato
as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we
find both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks,
one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of
Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum
total of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's
teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and
as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] Sextus
himself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can
have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the
desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of
Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as
probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another,
and departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterises
the sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4]
which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms
that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown
things to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference
underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus
was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the
part of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference between
the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the
introduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly gives
these statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns
the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or
if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable
that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]

[1] _Hyp._ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72.

[2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp._ I. 222.

[3] _Hyp._ I. 222.

[4] _Hyp._ I. 223.

[5] _Hyp_. I. 226.

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the
standpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards
trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians
declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and
they make a difference even in those ideas that they call
probable.

Sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of
difference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the
doctrine of probability which the Academician