gard to
the unknown, for we yield assent only to those things which
affect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them.

CHAPTER XXI.

_"Perhaps," and "It is possible," and "It may be."_

The formulae "Perhaps," and "Perhaps not," and "It is 194
possible," and "It is not possible," and "It may be," and "It
may not be," we use instead of "Perhaps it is," and "Perhaps it
is not," and "It is possible that it is," and "It is possible
that it is not," and "It may be that it is," and "It may be that
it is not." That is, we use the formula "It is not possible" for
the sake of brevity, instead of saying "It is not possible to
be," and "It may not be" instead of "It may not be that it is,"
and "Perhaps not" instead of "Perhaps it is not." Again, we do
not here dispute about words, neither do we question if the 195
formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely,
as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae
express Aphasia. For certainly the formula "Perhaps it is"
really includes that which seems to contradict it, _i.e._ the
formula "Perhaps it is not," because it does not affirm in in
regard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in
regard to the others.

CHAPTER XXII.

[Greek: epoche] _or the Suspension of Judgment._

When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot 196
say which of those things presented should be believed, and
which should not be believed, showing that things appear equal
to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now
we do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears
to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves
to us. [Greek: epoche] means the holding back of the opinion, so
as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality
of the things in question.

CHAPTER XXIII.

_The Formula "I determine Nothing."_

In regard to the formula "I determine nothing," we say the 197
following: By "determine" we mean, not simply to speak, but to
give assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing.
For it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing,
not even the formula "I determine nothing," for this formula is
not a dogmatic opinion, that is an assent to something unknown,
but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When,
for example, the Sceptic says, "I determine nothing," he means
this: "Ac