on itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is
sweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through 20
sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of
its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of
that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however,
argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the
intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness
of the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it
well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how
should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown,
so as not to rashly follow it?

CHAPTER XI.

_The Criterion of Scepticism._

It is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from 21
what we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. The
word criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a
proof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shall
speak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers to
action, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, in
doing some things and refraining from doing others, and it is
about this that we shall now speak. We say, consequently, that
the criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and in
calling it so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted, 22
as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling.
Hence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so,
but one questions if it is as it appears. Therefore, as we
cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily
life, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an
unprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the 23
daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it
is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the
necessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws
and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. It is
directed by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are 24
capable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of the
feelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; by
the traditions of laws and customs, for according to them we
consider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by the
teaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts we
undertake. We say all these things, however, without expressing
a decided opinion.

CHAPTER XII.