1, 96-98.
[2] _Hyp._ III. 24-28.
[3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 151.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 96.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 185.
[6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 77.
[7] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 507.
[8] Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 88.
CHAPTER IV.
_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus._
A paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which has
given rise to much speculation and many different theories, is
the comparison which Sextus makes of Scepticism with the
philosophy of Heraclitus.[1] In this paragraph the statement is
made that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri ton
Ainesidemon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy
of Heraclitus, because the doctrine that contradictory
predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the
way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality
applicable to the same thing.[2] [Greek: hoi peri ton
Ainesidemon elegon hodon einai ten skeptiken agogen epi ten
Herakleiteion philosophian, dioti proegeitai tou tanantia peri
to auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As the
Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be
applicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans come from this to
the more positive doctrine that they are in reality so.[3]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 210.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 210.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 210.
This connection which Aenesidemus is said to have affirmed
between Scepticism and the philosophy of Heraclitus is earnestly
combated by Sextus, who declares that the fact that
contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same
thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but a fact which presents
itself to all men, and not to the Sceptics only. No one for
instance, whether he be a Sceptic or not, would dare to say that
honey does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to
those who have the jaundice, so that Heraclitus begins from a
preconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps to
the other schools of philosophy as well.[1] As the statement
concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard
to the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, then
Scepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus
than to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use
common subject matter. "But we are afraid that the Sceptical
School not only does not help towards the knowledge of the
philosophy of Heraclitus, but even hinders that resu
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