wo phases of his life, which such a
change has already made us familiar with, he adds a third.
Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different
beliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims
that such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is
logical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem
from the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but
rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings
of Heraclitus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the
extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The
Sceptic says, "Contradictory predicates are apparently
applicable to the same thing," and Aenesidemus accepts the
Heraclitan result--"Contradictory predicates are in reality
applicable to the same thing." From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus
would seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying
that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. He
does not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it
incomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance of
contradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would
naturally ask, "Whence come these contradictory appearances?"
After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he
doubts. The system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he
accepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the
soul because they are an expression of reality.

[1] Brochard _Op. cit._ 272.

As a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he does
not find that the statement of Heraclitus disproves this, but
rather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existence
of science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it.
Brochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus
should have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras
was so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion,
Brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to
Aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory
predicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of the
foundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him a
Sceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves his
rank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School.

Coming now to the opinion of Zeller,[1] we find that he
advocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of Sextus.
The whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simple
fac