nt had been included, Napoleon's
estimate would not have been far wrong. At St. Helena he gave out that
his despatch of cavalry towards Hal had induced Wellington to weaken
his army to this extent; but Houssaye has shown that the statement is
an entire fabrication. The Emperor certainly believed that all
Wellington's troops were close at hand.[508]

The Duke, on his side, would doubtless have retreated had he known
that the Prussian advance would be as slow as it was. His composite
forces, in which five languages were spoken, were unfit for a long
contest with Napoleon's army. The Dutch-Belgian troops, numbering
17,000, were known to be half-hearted; the 2,800 Nassauers, who had
served under Soult in 1813, were not above suspicion; the 11,000
Hanoverians and 5,900 Brunswickers were certain to do their best, but
they were mostly raw troops. In fact, Wellington could thoroughly rely
only on his 23,990 British troops and the 5,800 men of the King's
German Legion; and among our men there was a large proportion of
recruits or drafts from militia battalions. Events were to prove that
this motley gathering could hold its own while at rest; but during the
subsequent march to Paris Wellington passed the scathing judgment
that, with the exception of his Peninsular men, it was "the worst
equipped army, with the worst staff, ever brought together."[509] This
was after he had lost De Lancey, Picton, Ponsonby, and many other able
officers; but on the morning of the 18th there was no lack of skill in
the placing of the troops, witness General Kennedy's arrangement of
Alten's division so that it might readily fall into the "chequer"
pattern, which proved so effective against the French horsemen.

Napoleon's confidence seemed to be well founded: he had 246 cannon
against the allies' 156, and his preponderance in cavalry of the line
was equally great. Above all, there were the 13,000 footmen of the
Imperial Guard, flanked by 3,000 cavaliers. The effective strength of
the two armies has been reckoned by Kennedy as in the proportion of
four to seven. Why, then, did he not attack at once? There were two
good reasons: first that his men had scattered widely overnight in
search of food and shelter, and now assembled very slowly on the
plateau; second, that the rain did not abate until 8 a.m., and even
then slight drizzles came on, leaving the ground totally unfit for the
movements of horse and artillery. Leaving the troops time to form and