d
there, especially near the transverse rise, our leader chiefly massed
his troops. Yet there, too, the defence had some advantages. The front
of the centre was protected by La Haye Sainte, "a strong stone and
brick building," says Cotton, "with a narrow orchard in front and a
small garden in the rear, both of which were hedged around, except on
the east side of the garden, where there was a strong wall running
along the high-road." It is generally admitted that Wellington gave
too little attention to this farm, which Napoleon saw to be the key of
the allied position. Loopholes were made in its south and east walls,
but none in the western wall, and half of the barn-door opening on the
fields had been torn off for firewood by soldiers overnight. The place
was held at first by 376 men of the King's German Legion, who threw up
a barricade at the barn-door, as also on the high-road outside the
orchard; but, as the sappers and carpenters were removed to
Hougoumont, little could be done.

Far stronger was the chateau of Hougoumont, which had been built with
a view to defence. The outbuildings were now loopholed, and scaffolds
were erected to enable our men to fire over the garden walls which
commanded the orchard. The defence was intrusted to the light
companies of the second battalions of Coldstreams and Foot Guards (now
the Grenadier Guards); while the wood in front was held by Nassauers
and Hanoverians. Chasse's Dutch-Belgians were posted at the village of
Braine la Leud to give further security to Wellington's right.[507]
Napoleon's intention was to pierce the allied centre behind La Haye
Sainte, where their lines were thin. But he did not know that behind
the crest ran a sunken cross-road, which afforded excellent cover, and
that the ground, sloping away towards Wellington's rear, screened his
second line and reserves.

It was this peculiarity of the ground, so different from that of the
exposed slope behind Ligny, that helped the great master of defensive
tactics secretly to meet and promptly to foil every onset of his
mighty antagonist.

While under-estimating the strength of Wellington's position Napoleon
over-rated his numbers. As we have seen, he remarked that the allies
exceeded the French by more than a fourth. Now, as his own numbers
were fully 74,000, he credited the allies with upwards of 92,000. In
reality, they were not more than 67,000, as Wellington had left 17,000
at Hal; but if this powerful detachme