ial title, namely during the negotiations of
1806 and 1814; and to recognize it after his public outlawry would
have been rather illogical, besides feeding the Bonapartists with
hopes which, in the interests of France, it was well absolutely to
close. Ministers might also urge that he himself had offered to live
in England _as a private individual_, and that his transference to St.
Helena, which allowed of greater personal liberty than could be
accorded in England, did not alter the essential character of his
detention. Nevertheless, their decision is to be regretted. The zeal
of his partisans, far from being quenched, was inflamed by what they
conceived to be a gratuitous insult; and these feelings, artfully
worked upon by tales, medals, and pictures of the modern Prometheus
chained to the rock, had no small share in promoting unrest in France.

Apart from this initial friction, Napoleon's relations to the Admiral
and officers were fairly cordial. He chatted with him at the
dinner-table and during the hour's walk that they afterwards usually
took on the quarter-deck. His conversations showed no signs of despair
or mental lethargy. They ranged over a great variety of topics,
general and personal. He discussed details of navigation and
shipbuilding with a minuteness of knowledge that surprised the men of
the sea.

From his political conversations with Cockburn we may cull the
following remarks. He said that he really meant to invade England in
1803-5, and to dictate terms of peace at London. He stoutly defended
his execution of the Duc d'Enghien, and named none of the paltry
excuses that his admirers were later on to discover for that crime.
Referring to recent events, he inveighed against the French Liberals,
declared that he had humoured the Chambers far too much, and dilated
on the danger of representative institutions on the Continent. However
much a Parliament might suit England, it was, he declared, highly
perilous in Continental States. With respect to the future of France,
he expressed the conviction that, as soon as the armies of occupation
were withdrawn, there would be a general insurrection owing to the
strong military bias of the people and their hatred of the Bourbons,
now again brought back by devastating hordes of foreigners.[544]

This last observation probably explains the general buoyancy of his
bearing. He did not consider the present settlement as final; and
doubtless it was his boundless fund of