ad
merited the name of bravest of the brave. At the crisis of the fight,
when the red squares in front defied his utmost efforts, he brandished
his sword in helpless wrath, praying that the bullets that flew by
might strike him down. The rage of battle had, in fact, partly
obscured his reason. He was now a fighter, scarcely a commander; and
to this cause we may attribute his neglect adequately to support
Kellermann's charge. Had this been done, Quatre Bras might have ended
like Marengo. Far more serious, however, was his action in
countermanding the Emperor's orders' by recalling D'Erlon to Quatre
Bras; for, as we have seen, it robbed his master of the decisive
victory that he had the right to expect at Ligny. Yet this error must
not be unduly magnified. It is true that Napoleon at 3.15 sent a
despatch to Ney bidding him envelop Bluecher's flank; but the order did
not reach him until some time after 5, when the allies were pressing
him hard, and when he had just heard of D'Erlon's deflection towards
the Emperor's battle.[495] He must have seen that his master misjudged
the situation at Quatre Bras; and in such circumstances a Marshal of
France was not without excuse when he corrected an order which he saw
to be based on a misunderstanding. Some part of the blame must surely
attach to the slow-paced D'Erlon and to the Emperor himself, who first
underrated the difficulties both at Ligny and Quatre Bras, and then
changed his plans when Ney was in the midst of a furious fight.

Nevertheless, the general results obtained on June the 16th were
enormously in favour of Napoleon. He had inflicted losses on the
Prussians comparable with those of Jena-Auerstaedt; and he retired to
rest at Fleurus with the conviction that they must hastily fall back
on their immediate bases of supply, Namur and Liege, leaving
Wellington at his mercy. The rules of war and the dictates of humdrum
prudence certainly prescribed this course for a beaten army,
especially as Buelow's corps was known to be on the Liege road.

Scarcely had the Prussian retreat begun in the darkness, when officers
pressed up to Gneisenau, on whom now devolved all responsibility, for
instructions as to the line of march. At once he gave the order to
push northwards to Tilly. General Reiche thereupon pointed out that
this village was not marked upon the smaller maps with which colonels
were provided; whereupon the command was given to march towards the
town of Wavre, farther