s law; nor is there any person or class of persons among
the Rejangs regularly invested with a legislative power. They are
governed in their various disputes by a set of long-established customs
(adat), handed down to them from their ancestors, the authority of which
is founded on usage and general consent. The chiefs, in pronouncing their
decisions, are not heard to say, "so the law directs," but "such is the
custom." It is true that, if any case arises for which there is no
precedent on record (of memory), they deliberate and agree on some mode
that shall serve as a rule in future similar circumstances. If the affair
be trifling that is seldom objected to; but when it is a matter of
consequence the pangeran, or kalippah (in places where such are present),
consults with the proattins, or lower order of chiefs, who frequently
desire time to consider of it, and consult with the inhabitants of their
dusun. When the point is thus determined the people voluntarily submit to
observe it as an established custom; but they do not acknowledge a right
in the chiefs to constitute what laws they think proper, or to repeal or
alter their ancient usages, of which they are extremely tenacious and
jealous. It is notwithstanding true that, by the influence of the
Europeans, they have at times been prevailed on to submit to innovations
in their customs; but, except when they perceived a manifest advantage
from the change, they have generally seized an opportunity of reverting
to the old practice.

MODE OF DECIDING CAUSES.

All causes, both civil and criminal, are determined by the several chiefs
of the district, assembled together at stated times for the purpose of
distributing justice. These meetings are called becharo (which signifies
also to discourse or debate), and among us, by an easy corruption,
bechars. Their manner of settling litigations in points of property is
rather a species of arbitration, each party previously binding himself to
submit to the award, than the exertion of a coercive power possessed by
the court for the redress of wrongs.

The want of a written criterion of the laws and the imperfect stability
of traditionary usage must frequently, in the intricacies of their suits,
give rise to contradictory decisions; particularly as the interests and
passions of the chiefs are but too often concerned in the determination
of the causes that come before them.

COMPILATION OF LAWS.

This evil had long been perceived by