me forward for the support of their
allies, the Hungarians, successful against Jellachich, drove him upon
Vienna, and by their victory strengthened the force that was to attack
that town. Under these circumstances it was the clear duty of Hungary
to support, without delay, and with all disposable forces, not the
Diet of Vienna, not the Committee of Safety or any other official body
at Vienna, but the _Viennese_ revolution. And if Hungary should even
have forgotten that Vienna had fought the first battle of Hungary, she
owed it to her own safety not to forget that Vienna was the only
outpost of Hungarian independence, and that after the fall of Vienna
nothing could meet the advance of the imperial troops against herself.
Now, we know very well all the Hungarians can say and have said in
defence of their inactivity during the blockade and storming of
Vienna: the insufficient state of their own force, the refusal of the
Diet or any other official body in Vienna to call them in, the
necessity to keep on constitutional ground, and to avoid
complications with the German central power. But the fact is, as to
the insufficient state of the Hungarian army, that in the first days
after the Viennese revolution and the arrival of Jellachich, nothing
was wanted in the shape of regular troops, as the Austrian regulars
were very far from being concentrated; and that a courageous,
unrelenting following up of the first advantage over Jellachich, even
with nothing but the _Land Sturm_ that had fought at Stuhlweissenburg,
would have sufficed to effect a junction with the Viennese, and to
adjourn to that day six months every concentration of an Austrian
army. In war, and particularly in revolutionary warfare, rapidity of
action until some decided advantage is gained is the first rule, and
we have no hesitation in saying that upon _merely military grounds_.
Perczel ought not to have stopped until his junction with the Viennese
was affected. There was certainly some risk, but who ever won a battle
without risking something? And did the people of Vienna risk nothing
when they drew upon themselves--they, a population of four hundred
thousand--the forces that were to march to the conquest of twelve
millions of Hungarians? The military fault committed by waiting until
the Austrians had united, and by making the feeble demonstration at
Schwechat which ended, as it deserved to do, in an inglorious
defeat--this military fault certainly incurred more