e summer of 1862 an offensive policy, this party--or faction, or what
you will--continued its career of opposition. That the secretive habit
of the Confederate Government helped cement the opposition cannot be
doubted. It is also likely that this opposition gave a vent to certain
jealous spirits who had missed the first place in leadership.

Furthermore, the issue of state sovereignty had been raised. In
Georgia a movement had begun which was distinctly different from the
Virginia-Carolina movement of opposition, a movement for which Rhett
and Pollard had scarcely more than disdainful tolerance, and not always
that. This parallel opposition found vent, as did the other, in a
political pamphlet. On the subject of conscription Davis and the
Governor of Georgia--that same Joseph E. Brown who had seized Fort
Pulaski in the previous year--exchanged a rancorous correspondence.
Their letters were published in a pamphlet of which Pollard said
scornfully that it was hawked about in every city of the South. Brown,
taking alarm at the power given the Confederate Government by the
Conscription Act, eventually defined his position, and that of a large
following, in the extreme words: "No act of the Government of the United
States prior to the secession of Georgia struck a blow at constitutional
liberty so fell as has been stricken by the conscript acts."

There were other elements of discontent which were taking form as early
as the autumn of 1862 but which were not yet clearly defined. But the
two obvious sources of internal criticism just described were enough
to disquiet the most resolute administration. When the triple offensive
broke down, when the ebb-tide began, there was already everything that
was needed to precipitate a political crisis. And now the question
arises whether the Confederate Administration had itself to blame. Had
Davis proved inadequate in his great undertaking?

The one undeniable mistake of the Government previous to the autumn of
1862 was its excessive secrecy. As to the other mistakes attributed to
it at the time, there is good reason to call them misfortunes. Today
we can see that the financial situation, the cotton situation, the
relations with Europe, the problem of equipping the armies, were all to
a considerable degree beyond the control of the Confederate Government.
If there is anything to be added to its mistaken secrecy as a definite
cause of irritation, it must be found in the general tone giv