otten that Davis
entered office without the backing of any definite faction. He was a
"dark horse," a compromise candidate. To build up a stanch following, to
create enthusiasm for his Administration, was a prime necessity of
his first year as President. Yet he seems not to have realized this
necessity. Boldly, firmly, dogmatically, he gave his whole thought and
his entire energy to organizing the Government in such a way that it
could do its work efficiently. And therein may have been the proverbial
rift within the lute. To Davis statecraft was too much a thing of
methods and measures, too little a thing of men and passions.

During the autumn of 1862 and the following winter the disputes over
the conduct of the war began to subside and two other themes became
prominent: the sovereignty of the States, which appeared to be menaced
by the Government, and the personality of Davis, whom malcontents
regarded as a possible despot. Contrary to tradition, the first note
of alarm over state rights was not struck by its great apostle Rhett,
although the note was sounded in South Carolina in the early autumn.
There existed in this State at that time an extra assembly called the
"Convention," which had been organized in 1860 for the general purpose
of seeing the State through the "revolution." In the Convention,
in September, 1862, the question of a contest with the Confederate
Government on the subject of a state army was definitely raised. It was
proposed to organize a state army and to instruct the Legislature
to "take effectual measures to prevent the agents of the Confederate
Government from raising troops in South Carolina except by voluntary
enlistment or by applying to the Executive of the State to call out the
militia as by law organized, or some part of it to be mustered into the
Confederate service." This proposal brought about a sharp debate
upon the Confederate Government and its military policy. Rhett made a
remarkable address, which should of itself quiet forever the old
tale that he was animated in his opposition solely by the pique of
a disappointed candidate for the presidency. Though as sharp as ever
against the Government and though agreeing wholly with the spirit of
the state army plan, he took the ground that circumstances at the moment
rendered the organization of such an army inopportune. A year earlier he
would have strongly supported the plan. In fact, in opposition to Davis
he had at that time, he said,