he generals
would soon attempt to withdraw Lee's army south of Virginia, and that
the Virginia troops in that army would refuse to go. "It is natural
under the circumstances," said he, "that they would not." He would
prepare for this emergency by an agreement among the Southeastern and
Gulf States to act together irrespective of Richmond, and would thus
weld the military power of these States into "a compact and organized
mass."

Governor Vance, with unconscious subtlety, etched a portrait of his own
mind when he replied that the crisis demanded "particularly the skill of
the politician perhaps more than that of the great general." He adroitly
evaded saying what he really thought of the situation but he made two
explicit counter-proposals. He suggested that a demand should be made
for the restoration of General Johnston and for the appointment of
General Lee to "full and absolute command of all the forces of the
Confederacy." On the day on which Vance wrote to Magrath, the Mercury
lifted up its voice and cried out for a Lee to take charge of the
Government and save the Confederacy. About the same time Cobb wrote
to Davis in the most friendly way, warning him that he had scarcely
a supporter left in Georgia, and that, in view of the great popular
reaction in favor of Johnston, concessions to the opposition were an
imperative necessity. "By accident," said he, "I have become possessed
of the facts in connection with the proposed action of the Governors of
certain States." He disavowed any sympathy with the movement but warned
Davis that it was a serious menace.

Two other intrigues added to the general political confusion. One of
these, the "Peace Movement," will be considered in the next chapter. The
other was closely connected with the alleged conspiracy to depose Davis
and set up Lee as dictator. If the traditional story, accepted by
able historians, may be believed, William C. Rives, of the Confederate
Congress, carried in January, 1865, to Lee from a congressional cabal
an invitation to accept the role of Cromwell. The greatest difficulty in
the way of accepting the tradition is the extreme improbability that any
one who knew anything of Lee would have been so foolish as to make such
a proposal. Needless to add, the tradition includes Lee's refusal to
overturn the Government. There can be no doubt, however, that all the
enemies of Davis in Congress and out of it, in the opening months of
1865, made a determined ser