f the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory
of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to
imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of
ideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then
in what relation does his account of language stand to the rest of his
philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them?
(For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue is merely
intended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or
realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many other
passages)...These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind
of the reader of the Cratylus. And the consideration of them may form a
convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue.
We must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally
to some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the
absolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek
temple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard.
They have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom
of conversation. 'Words are more plastic than wax' (Rep.), and may be
moulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another, careless
of the unity of his work, not fearing any 'judge, or spectator, who
may recall him to the point' (Theat.), 'whither the argument blows we
follow' (Rep.). To have determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic
treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would have been fatal
to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the soul of the
dialogue...These remarks are applicable to nearly all the works of
Plato, but to the Cratylus and Phaedrus more than any others. See
Phaedrus, Introduction.
There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may
be more truly viewed:--they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We
have found that in the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Protagoras, Meno,
we arrived at no conclusion--the different sides of the argument
were personified in the different speakers; but the victory was not
distinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property
of any. And in the Cratylus we have no reason to assume that Socrates is
either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently
inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying, in the
character
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