ld sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying
that which is not, and therefore saying nothing;--you cannot utter the
word which is not. Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle
for an old man to understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were
to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! would these words be true
or false? 'I should say that they would be mere unmeaning sounds, like
the hammering of a brass pot.' But you would acknowledge that names,
as well as pictures, are imitations, and also that pictures may give a
right or wrong representation of a man or woman:--why may not names
then equally give a representation true and right or false and wrong?
Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation,
but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man
and say 'this is year picture,' and again, he may go and say to him
'this is your name'--in the one case appealing to his sense of sight,
and in the other to his sense of hearing;--may he not? 'Yes.' Then you
will admit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if
of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then
of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to
pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of
them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture, and
he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a
picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who
gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The
artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a
bad artist. 'Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not parallel; for if you
subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.' Socrates
admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to
be 10, but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature.
Suppose that there are two objects--Cratylus and the image of Cratylus;
and let us imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, both in
their outward form and in their inner nature and qualities: then
there will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of
Cratylus. But an image in fact always falls short in some degree of the
original, and if images are not exact counterparts, why should names
be? if they were, they would be the doubles of their originals, and
indistinguishable from them; and how ri