y to another; as if the essence of body were a
thing different from the essence of beauty. In the first place then,
what is that, which, by its presence, causes the beauty of bodies? Let
us reflect, what most powerfully attracts the eyes of beholders, and
seizes the spectator with rapturous delight; for if we can find what
this is, we may perhaps use it as a ladder, enabling us to ascend into
the region of beauty, and survey its immeasurable extent.

It is the general opinion that a certain commensuration of parts to
each other, and to the whole, with the addition, of colour, generates
that beauty which is the object of sight; and that in the
commensurate and the moderate alone the beauty of everything
consists. But from such an opinion the compound only, and not the
simple, can be beautiful, the single parts will have no peculiar
beauty; and will only merit that appellation by conferring to the
beauty of the whole. But it is surely necessary that a lovely whole
should consist of beautiful parts, for the fair can never rise out of the
deformed. But from such a definition, it follows, that beautiful
colours and the light of the sun, since they are simple and do not
receive their beauty from commensuration, must be excluded the
regions of beauty. Besides, how, from such an hypothesis can gold
be beautiful? Or the glittering of night and the glorious spectacle of
the stars? In like manner, the most simple musical sounds will be
foreign from beauty, though in a song wholly beautiful every note
must be beautiful, as necessary to the being of the whole. Again,
since the same proportion remaining, the same face is to one person
beautiful and to another the reverse, is it not necessary to call
the beauty of the commensurate one kind of beauty and the
commensuration another kind, and that the commensurate is fair by
means of something else? But if transferring themselves to beautiful
studies and fair discourses, they shall assign as the cause of beauty
in these the proportion of measure, what is that which in beautiful
sciences, laws or disciplines, is called commensurate proportion? Or
in what manner can speculations themselves be called mutually
commensurate? If it be said because of the inherent concord, we
reply that there is a certain concord and consent in evil souls, a
conformity of sentiment, in believing (as it is said) that temperance
is folly and justice generous ignorance. It appears, therefore, that the
beauty of t