pinion, the sport of the waves of prejudice and blown
about by the breath of factious party. Like substance and shade,
indeed they possess a similitude in outward appearance, but in
reality they are perfect contraries; for the one fills the mind with
solid and durable good, but the other with empty delusions; which
like the ever-running waters of the Danaides, glide away as fast as
they enter, and leave nothing behind but the ruinous passages
through which they flowed.
I only add, that the ensuing treatise is designed as a specimen
(if it should meet with encouragement) of my intended mode of
publishing all the works of Plotinus. The undertaking is, I am
sensible, arduous in the extreme; and the disciples of wisdom are
unfortunately few; but, as I desire no other reward of my labour,
than to have the expense of printing defrayed, and to see Truth
propagated in my native tongue; I hope those few will enable me to
obtain the completion of my desires. For then, to adopt the words of
Ulysses,
"That view vouchsaf'd, let instant death surprise
With ever-during shade these happy eyes!"[3]
CONCERNING THE BEAUTIFUL
Beauty[4] for the most part, consists in objects of sight; but it is also
received through the ears, by the skilful composition of words, and
the consonant proportion of sounds; for in every species of harmony,
beauty is to be found. And if we rise from sense into the regions of
soul, we shall there perceive studies and offices, actions and habits,
sciences and virtues, invested with a much larger portion of beauty.
But whether there is above these, a still higher beauty, will appear as
we advance in its investigation. What is it then, which causes bodies
to appear fair to the sight, sounds beautiful to the ear, and science
and virtue lovely to the mind? May we not enquire after what
manner they all partake of beauty? Whether beauty is one and the
same in all? Or, whether the beauty of bodies is of one kind, and the
beauty of souls of another? And again, what these are, if they are
two? Or, what beauty is, if perfectly simple, and one? For some
things, as bodies, are doubtless beautiful, not from the natures of the
subjects in which they reside, but rather by some kind of
participation; but others again appear to be essentially beautiful, or
beauties themselves; and such is the nature of virtue. For, with
respect, to the same bodies, they appear beautiful to one person, and
the reverse of beaut
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