els badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade a
distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval
fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible
to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets
as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way
affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.

But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid
down must never be lost sight of.

Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of
reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to
a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry,
when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this
way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.

Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the
increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on
Cavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They try
to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught
to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight,
squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot,
regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be.

I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war
efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard
altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on
our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are
many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable
consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.

After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report
to the King of Prussia:--

'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres,
where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore
shirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much as
possible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsaetze,'
Berlin, 1900).

By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such
timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words
of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination
to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which
might bring them in conta