vance by
keeping down hostile gun and rifle fire--therefore, in the initial
stages, a commanding position is required; during the decisive stage
concentration on the objective of the decisive blow is required; and
after the successful assault guns may be required to be hurried forward
to repel {63} counter-attacks, to break down protracted opposition, and
to complete the rout by harassing the fleeing enemy. When the attack
is directed against a position the defence of which is known to have
been elaborately organised, a pre-arranged covering fire in the form of
an artillery barrage, lifted in successive stages as the attack
advances, may require to be organised some time before the attack is
launched. It will be necessary to detail an escort for the guns,
unless the distribution of the troops for the attack already provides
such protection. At the _Battle of Verneville_ (August 18, 1870) the
9th Prussian Corps Artillery had been pushed forward against the French
position at Armandvillers-Folie. The fire of the French infantry
caused a loss of 13 officers and 187 other ranks, and one battery was
disabled, before the guns were withdrawn. There was no infantry escort
to keep the attacking riflemen at a distance. At the _Battle of
Colenso_ (December 15, 1899) two batteries of field artillery advanced
into action without an escort, and without previous reconnaissance
unlimbered on a projecting spit of land in a loop of the Tugela River.
Frontal fire from hidden trenches on the opposite bank and enfilade
fire from a re-entrant flank killed all the horses and the greater part
of the personnel, and although the utmost gallantry was shown by all
ranks ten of the twelve guns were left in Boer hands. Infantry
regimental officers and battalion commanders must be acquainted with
the amount of ammunition carried by their accompanying artillery, in
order that ammunition may not be wasted by calling for fire on targets
of secondary importance. All reserves, whether they have been
specially detailed or not for the purpose, must of their own accord
make every effort to assist in getting forward guns and ammunition.
One of the outstanding lessons of the War of 1914-1918 is the
possibility of placing even the heaviest artillery close behind the
infantry fighting line owing to the mobility afforded by motor traction
and to the security against {64} counter-attack provided by the deadly
fire of the magazine rifles and machine guns of