o-operating troops and arms; he will
allot tasks to the companies and to the machine-gun platoon (if not
brigaded) and will define the frontage of the forward companies; he
will also detail the assembly positions, give compass-bearings for the
advance, describe the action of other arms in support, make the
necessary signalling arrangements, notify the zero hour, arrange for
the synchronisation of watches, notify his own position before, during,
and after the Attack, and indicate the point to which reports are to be
sent, notify the medical arrangements, and issue instructions as to the
collection of stragglers, the escort and destination of prisoners, the
supply of ammunition, and the equipment to be worn. The quartermaster
will receive orders as to the bringing up of rations during the battle.
Before issuing to the Attack a proportion of officers and other ranks
will be detailed to remain behind, to replace casualties when the
engagement is over.

{75}

The position of the battalion commander will be chosen with a view to
keeping in touch with the progress of the Attack in all its stages and
of influencing the fight by means of the reserves. Personal control is
difficult to exercise once troops are committed to the fight, but
opportunities for rapid decision were frequently offered to battalion
commanders in the Great War, and seized with a success which
transformed a check into a victory. In 1916 a battalion commander of
the Coldstream Guards, seeing his command disorganised by fire and
resistance, by personal example rallied and reorganised the waves of
the Attack and added the necessary momentum to the assault, which then
reached its objective. On April 14, 1917, the commander of a battalion
of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment witnessed the launching of a local
counter-attack by the Germans on the village of _Monchy-le-Preux_, and
by a rapid advance with the fighting portion of his headquarters,
staved off the attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the 88th
Brigade enabled it to be driven back in disorder. On November 30,
1917, during the German counter-attack from Fontaine Notre Dame to
Tadpole Copse, in the Northern Sector of the _Cambrai_ zone, the
Germans forced their way into our foremost positions, and opened a gap
between the 1/6th and 1/15th London Regiments. Local counter-attacks
led by the two battalion commanders with all available men, including
the personnel of their respective headquart