ver which the enemy
can advance, but the front and flanks of neighbouring strong points.
This line will be strengthened, as and when necessary, by throwing in
the supports, and it will be assisted at critical moments by the local
reserves, which, coming up unseen, will deliver local counter-attacks
on the assaulting enemy, and will thus restore the battle at threatened
points by relieving the pressure on the front line. Their work
completed they will be rallied and withdrawn again into local reserve,
and it is highly important that they should be kept well under control,
or their successful efforts may be neutralised by local reserves of the
attacking force. At _Talavera_ (July 27, 1809) a portion of the
British force followed up the repulsed French columns too far, and
being in turn broken and driven back, was pursued closely by the enemy
and retired in disorder to the position. At the battle of
_Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) two brigades emerged from the
Confederate position and drove Meade's division of the Army of the
Potomac out of their lines. But they rushed on with reckless
impetuosity and were finally driven back with heavy loss. Local
counter-attacks keep alive an offensive spirit in the defenders,
exhaust the enemy's powers, draw his reserves into the battle, and thus
prepare the opportunity for the Decisive Counter-Attack. The local
reserves of flank sections should usually be echeloned in rear of the
flank, which can thus be protected at need by determined
counter-attacks on the flank of the enveloping force.

_The General Reserve is for the Decisive Counter-Attack_ and is held
for this purpose in the hands of the {93} commander of the whole force,
in order that it may be used to crush and overthrow the enemy's main
attack. The opportunity for this effort is generally obtained only
when the enemy has thrown into action his own General Reserve for the
decisive attack, and has received a check. A bold and resolute
counter-attack at that moment is bound to achieve a decisive success.
But the assumption of the _grand offensive should not be confined to
the General Reserve alone_. Commanders of sections of the defence who
are permitted by the local situation to do so, must at once join in the
decisive counter-attack, unless express orders to the contrary have
been received; and any definite success obtained must be the signal for
the whole force to press the enemy with the utmost vigour. This
op