ue of food and hot drink, the distribution of ammunition and the
filling of water bottles. As a general rule, it is left to the
battalion commander to select Positions of Assembly for each of his
companies. When large bodies of troops are assembled with a view to
immediate action, it must always be remembered that large forces cannot
be moved by a single road if all arms are to be brought into action at
the right moment. In April, 1864, General Banks, with 25,000 U.S.
troops, moved from Grand Ecore to _Pleasant Hill_ in the Red River
Valley. Although lateral roads existed, his column marched on one main
road only, and twenty miles separated his front and rear. As he came
into action with General Forrest, of the Confederate Army, the head of
his column was defeated and thrown back again and again by forces
inferior in total strength, but superior on the field of the encounter.
Had General Banks used two or more parallel roads, which were available
for his use, the Confederates on the spot would have been quickly
overpowered.

THE ATTACKING FORCE.--The commander must decide against which portion
or portions of the hostile position, or along which lines of advance,
his Fire Attack shall be developed. As the object of this movement is
to pin the enemy to his position, to wear down his resistance
generally, and particularly at the point where the Decisive Attack is
to be delivered, as well as to effect a lodgment in the position, it is
clear that the greater the extent of the objective the better, and one
or both flanks should be threatened if possible. But whenever a Fire
Attack is developed it must be in sufficient strength to occupy the
enemy's attention fully and it must be carried through with vigour once
begun. One {60} to three rifles per yard of the objective to be
assailed is generally regarded as the requisite strength of the Forward
Body, Supports, and Local Reserves. At _St. Privat_ (August 18, 1870)
a first and second line made a frontal attack and came under fire of
the French chassepots, to which their own shorter-ranged rifles could
make no effective reply. The lines pressed on, but were ultimately
brought to a standstill through lack of reinforcements, which could
have been sent up against the flank of the fire position which was
holding up the attack, under cover of the fire of the troops in
position, and would thus have carried the Forward Body to the assault.

Equally unsuccessful was Osman Pas