we have now before
us sanctions the doctrine that it may be so regarded, if only we
remember that its causal activity depends upon its identity with the
obverse aspect known as cerebration, without which identity in apparent
duality neither volition nor cerebration could be the cause which in
fact they are. It thus becomes a mere matter of phraseology whether we
speak of the will determining, or being determined by, changes going on
in the external world; just as it is but a matter of phraseology whether
we speak of temperature determining, or being determined by, molecular
vibration. All the requirements alike of the free-will and of the
bond-will hypotheses are thus satisfied by a synthesis which comprises
them both. On the one hand, it would be as impossible for an
_un_conscious automaton to do the work or to perform the adjustments of
a conscious agent, as it would be for an Edison lamp to give out light
and cause a photograph when not heated by an electric current. On the
other hand, it would be as impossible for the will to originate bodily
movement without the occurrence of a strictly physical process of
cerebration, as it would be for light to shine in an Edison lamp which
had been deprived of its carbon-burner.

It may be said of this theory that it is highly speculative, not
verifiable by any possible experiment, and therefore at best is but a
mere guess. All which is, no doubt, perfectly true; but, on the other
hand, we must remember that this theory comes to us as the only one
which is logically possible, and at the same time competent to satisfy
the facts alike of the outer and of the inner world. It is a speculation
in the sense of not being verifiable by experiment; but it has much more
value than ordinarily attaches to an unverifiable speculation, in that
there is really no alternative hypothesis to be considered: if we choose
to call it a guess, we must at the same time remember it is a guess
where it does not appear that any other is open. Once more to quote
Hobbes, who, as we have seen, was himself a remarkable instance of what
he here says: 'The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the
best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he
guesses at.' In this case, therefore, the best prophet is not the
physiologist, whose guess ends in materialism; nor the purely mental
philosopher, whose guess ends in spiritualism; but rather the man who,
being 'versed and studied' in all t