talents, are all parts and
elements of the general aggregate of power; but numbers, nevertheless,
constitute ordinarily the most important consideration, unless, indeed,
there be _a military force_ in the hands of the few, by which they can
control the many. In this country we have actually existing systems of
government, in the maintenance of which, it should seem, a great
majority, both in numbers and in other means of power and influence,
must see their interest. But this state of things is not brought about
solely by written political constitutions, or the mere manner of
organizing the government; but also by the laws which regulate the
descent and transmission of property. The freest government, if it could
exist, would not be long acceptable, if the tendency of the laws were to
create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands, and to render the
great mass of the population dependent and penniless. In such a case,
the popular power would be likely to break in upon the rights of
property, or else the influence of property to limit and control the
exercise of popular power. Universal suffrage, for example, could not
long exist in a community where there was great inequality of property.
The holders of estates would be obliged, in such case, in some way to
restrain the right of suffrage, or else such right of suffrage would,
before long, divide the property. In the nature of things, those who
have not property, and see their neighbors possess much more than they
think them to need, cannot be favorable to laws made for the protection
of property. When this class becomes numerous, it grows clamorous. It
looks on property as its prey and plunder, and is naturally ready, at
all times, for violence and revolution.

It would seem, then, to be the part of political wisdom to found
government on property; and to establish such distribution of property,
by the laws which regulate its transmission and alienation, as to
interest the great majority of society in the support of the government.
This is, I imagine, the true theory and the actual practice of our
republican institutions. With property divided as we have it, no other
government than that of a republic could be maintained, even were we
foolish enough to desire it. There is reason, therefore, to expect a
long continuance of our system. Party and passion, doubtless, may
prevail at times, and much temporary mischief be done. Even modes and
forms may be changed, and per