sistance would be less forcible, or less successful,
because the number of such proprietors happened to be great. Each would
perceive his own importance, and his own interest, and would feel that
natural elevation of character which the consciousness of property
inspires. A common sentiment would unite all, and numbers would not only
add strength, but excite enthusiasm. It is true, that France possesses
a vast military force, under the direction of an hereditary executive
government; and military power, it is possible, may overthrow any
government. It is in vain, however, in this period of the world, to look
for security against military power to the arm of the great landholders.
That notion is derived from a state of things long since past; a state
in which a feudal baron, with his retainers, might stand against the
sovereign and his retainers, himself but the greatest baron. But at
present, what could the richest landholder do, against one regiment of
disciplined troops? Other securities, therefore, against the prevalence
of military power must be provided. Happily for us, we are not so
situated as that any purpose of national defence requires, ordinarily
and constantly, such a military force as might seriously endanger our
liberties.

In respect, however, to the recent law of succession in France, to which
I have alluded, I would, presumptuously perhaps, hazard a conjecture,
that, if the government do not change the law, the law in half a century
will change the government; and that this change will be, not in favor
of the power of the crown, as some European writers have supposed, but
against it. Those writers only reason upon what they think correct
general principles, in relation to this subject. They acknowledge a want
of experience. Here we have had that experience; and we know that a
multitude of small proprietors, acting with intelligence, and that
enthusiasm which a common cause inspires, constitute not only a
formidable, but an invincible power.[14]

The true principle of a free and popular government would seem to be, so
to construct it as to give to all, or at least to a very great majority,
an interest in its preservation; to found it, as other things are
founded, on men's interest. The stability of government demands that
those who desire its continuance should be more powerful than those who
desire its dissolution. This power, of course, is not always to be
measured by mere numbers. Education, wealth,