"August 7 the notice of bombardment after forty-eight hours, or sooner
if the Spanish fire continued, was served, and after that date not
a shot was fired on either side until the assault was made on August
13. It was with great difficulty, and in some cases not without force,
that the insurgents were restrained from opening fire and thus drawing
the fire of the Spaniards during this period.

"Owing to the heavy storm and high surf it was impossible to
communicate promptly with the division commander at Cavite, and I
received my instructions direct from the major-general commanding,
or his staff officers, one of whom visited my camp every day, and I
reported direct to him in the same manner. My instructions were to
occupy the insurgent trenches near the beach, so as to be in a good
position to advance on Manila when ordered, but meanwhile to avoid
precipitating an engagement, not to waste ammunition, and (after August
1) not to return the enemy's fire unless convinced that he had left
his trenches and was making an attack in force. These instructions
were given daily in the most positive terms to the officer commanding
in the trenches, and in the main they were faithfully carried out.

"More ammunition than necessary was expended on the nights of August
2 and 5, but in both cases the trenches were occupied by troops under
fire for the first time, and in the darkness and rain there was ground
to believe that the heavy fire indicated a real attack from outside
the enemy's trenches. The total expenditure of ammunition on our side
in the four engagements was about 150,000 rounds, and by the enemy
very much more.

"After the attack of July 31-August I, I communicated by signal
with the captain of the U. S. S. Raleigh, anchored about 3,000 yards
southwest of my camp, asking if he had received orders in regard to the
action of his ship in case of another attack on my troops. He replied:

"Both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt desire to avoid general action
at present. If attack too strong for you, we will assist you, and
another vessel will come and offer help. "In repeating this message,
Lieutenant Tappan, commanding U. S. S. Callao, anchored nearer the
beach, sent me a box of blue lights, and it was agreed that if I
burned one of these on the beach the Raleigh would at once open fire
on the Spanish fort."

General Merritt speaks of the Colorado skirmishers leaving their
breastworks when the navy ceased firing on the