ish were known to have a gunboat or two lurking in the islands
within striking distance of our transports, unarmed vessels--except
a few deck pieces of field artillery--with more than a thousand men
on each. General Merritt wanted the escort of ships of war to make
all secure, and application to Admiral Dewey to send one of his war
boats, brought the statement that he could not spare a ship. Just at
that time he heard of the run by Camara with the Cadiz fleet Eastward
on the Mediterranean, and soon he had word that the Pelayo and her
companions were in the Suez canal. General Greene had not arrived
at Manila at that time, and the monitors Monterey and Monadnock were
getting along slowly. Dewey knew he would have to evacuate the scene
of his victory in case Camara was fully committed to go to Manila, and
wait for the Monitors, and when he got them he said he would return
and sink another Spanish fleet, but that was something it might be
critical to explain, and General Merritt, after leaving San Francisco,
did not get any news for twenty-six days. All that time he would have
had no justification for surprise if he had been attacked by a Spanish
gunboat, and if the Spaniards had pushed on their Rapide--the converted
German liner the Normania--she could have been handled to cut off the
American reinforcements on the way to the camps of the little American
army already landed. When General Merritt reached Cavite, he found the
situation difficult for the army and pushed things as the only way to
get out of trouble. He had two armies to deal with, one the Spaniards,
fiercely hostile, and the other, the Filipinos, factional and jealous,
each outnumbering by five thousand the American forces with which
the city was assailed and finally captured. There was no time lost,
and if there had been any delay, even two days, the peace protocol
would have found our army in the trenches, and the city belonging to
the Spaniards. It was the energy of General Merritt, heartily shared
by his division commanders, that prevented this embarrassment,
which would have been a moral and military misfortune. We have
given the General's orders to his troops and the Filipinos after
the fall of the city--also his original statement of policy, and
noted how cleverly they supported each other, and how smoothly the
work of organization and administration is carried on the world is
well aware. The orders deputing the officers to discharge certain
duties are