ing?

That the Spaniards, sir, are now enabled to make resistance, and,
perhaps, to insult and depopulate our colonies; that the French have
despatched a fleet into the American seas, to obstruct, as may be
conjectured, the progress of our arms, and that we are in danger of
meeting opposition which we did not expect, is too evident to be
concealed.

But, sir, is not the spirit of our enemies the consequence rather of our
cowardice than of their own strength? Does not the opposition to our
designs, by whatever nation it shall be made, arise from the contempt
which has been brought upon us by our irresolution, forbearance, and
delays? Had we resented the first insult, and repaired our earliest
losses by vigorous reprisals, our merchants had long ago carried on
their traffick with security, our enemies would have courted us with
respect, and our allies supported us with confidence.

Our negotiations, treaties, proposals, and concessions, not only
afforded them leisure to collect their forces, equip their fleets, and
fortify their coasts; but gave them, likewise, spirit to resist those
who could not be conquered but by their own cowardice and folly. By our
ill-timed patience, and lingering preparations, we encouraged those to
unite against us, who would, otherwise, have only hated us in secret;
and deterred those from declaring in our favour, whom interest or
gratitude might have inclined to assist us. For who will support those
from whom no mutual support can be expected? And who will expect that
those will defend their allies, who desert themselves?

But, sir, however late our resentment was awakened, had the war been
prosecuted vigorously after it was declared, we might have been now
secure from danger, and freed from suspense, nor would any thing have
remained but to give laws to our enemies.

From the success of Vernon with so inconsiderable forces, we may
conjecture what would have been performed with an armament proportioned
to his undertaking; and why he was not better supplied, no reason has
yet been given; nor can it be easily discovered why we either did not
begin the war before our enemies had concerted their measures, or delay
it till we had formed our own.

Notwithstanding some opportunities have been neglected, and all the
advantages of a sudden attack have been irrecoverably lost;
notwithstanding our friends, sir, have learned to despise and neglect
us, and our enemies are animated to confidence and o