ly opposed, lest it should become
established by long custom, and entangle itself with our constitution.

If the minister, my lords, has made it necessary to employ none but his
adherents and blind followers, this necessity is alone a sufficient
proof how little he confides in his own prudence or integrity, how
apprehensive he is of the censure of the senate, and how desirous of
continuing his authority, by avoiding it. And, surely, my lords, it is
our duty, as well as our right, to address the throne, that a minister
should be removed who fears the people, since few men fear without
hating, and nothing so much contributes to make any man an enemy to his
country, as the consciousness that he is universally abhorred.

But, my lords, if this is done by him without necessity, if the general
preference of his friends is only the consequence of mistaken judgment,
or corrupt gratitude, this address is equally necessary, because the
effects are equally pernicious.

When a minister, suspected of ill intentions, is continued in
employment, discontent must naturally spread over the nation; and if the
end of government be the happiness of the people; if suspicion and
jealousy be contrary to a state of happiness; and if this suspicion
which generally prevails, this discontent which fills the whole nation,
can only be appeased by the removal of the minister; prudence, justice,
and the examples of our ancestors, ought to influence us to endeavour
that the affairs of the nation may be transferred to such whose greater
integrity or wisdom has recommended them to the affection of the people.

In this motion, therefore, we need not be supposed to imply that the
minister is either ignorant or corrupt, but that he is disliked by the
people, disliked to such a degree, my lords, that it is not safe for his
majesty to employ him.

It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the
people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to
remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own
danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to
suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor
the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the
more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.

By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security
of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general