olled
ununiformed militia should be sufficient to pay the entire expenditures
of the State military department.

To honor discharged men and officers with a kind of brevet commission
would be an incentive for ability and efficiency, and would be of
sufficient value to invite the best class of young men to the ranks.
Whatever may be questionable in the action of Congress for reducing the
force of the regular army, there can be none in the policy of the State
for reducing its force to the lowest possible point. Every man should
be released from the ranks that can be, both in justice to himself and
for general industrial effect. The cost of company drills, regimental
brigade and division parades in time and money is immense, and out of
all proportion to the doubtful value of such services, constituted as
the force is. But a compact, thoroughly disciplined, and perfectly
drilled force, of the highest obtainable military character, is
necessary and should be well maintained for contingent purposes.

I have thrown out these views as applicable to the city and State of
New York; but the ideas can be applied to the military department of
every State, with such modifications as may be found necessary.

It would be expensive, impolitic, and unnecessary for the general
Government to keep a regular army, through years of peace, of
sufficient numerical force to meet successfully internal outbreaks or
external pressure. The militia force should be trained to be the
supporting power of the army for such contingencies. The doubts and
fears and awful suspense of the people during the early days of the
late rebellion would have been greatly lessened, perhaps quite avoided,
had the regular and militia forces been in effective readiness for the
struggle, and met the necessity of the hour. The uniformed corps could
have been ordered to the front for temporary defence, as some were, and
time given for mobilizing the ununiformed troops.

As it was all was confusion, distrust, and almost despair; only for the
instinctive loyalty and inherent courage of the people, all would have
been lost. The men of the first levy, the rank and file, were
magnificent in material, confident in ability, honest in purpose, crude
in development, difficult to discipline--it was hard for them to come
under military law. Many of their officers were adventurers without
experience or qualifications for command. They obtained commissions
through personal influence