n too late for
the best interests of England. The year 1795, just ending, was one in
which the energies of France, after the fierce rush of the Terror, had
flagged almost to collapse. Not only so, but in its course the republic,
discouraged by frequent failure, had decided to abandon the control of
the sea to its enemy, to keep its great fleets in port, and to confine
its efforts to the harassment of British commerce. To this change of
policy in France is chiefly to be ascribed the failure of naval
achievement with which Macaulay has reproached Pitt's earlier ministry.
Battles cannot be fought if the foe keeps behind his walls. Prior to
this decision, two fleet battles had been fought in the Mediterranean in
the spring and summer of 1795, in which the British had missed great
successes only through the sluggishness of their admiral. "To say how
much we wanted Lord Hood" (the last commander-in-chief), wrote Nelson,
"is to ask, 'Will you have all the French fleet or no battle?'" Could he
have foreseen all that Jervis was to be to the Mediterranean, his
distress must have been doubled to know that the fortunes of the nation
thus fell between two stools.

His predecessor's slackness in pushing military opportunities, due
partly to ill health, was mainly constitutional, and therefore could not
but show itself by tangible evidences in the more purely administrative
and disciplinary work. Jervis found himself at once under the necessity
of bringing his fleet--in equipment, in discipline, and in
drill--sharply up to that level of efficiency which is essential to the
full development of power when occasion offers. This his perfect
achievement, of organization and administration, in its many intricate
details, needs at least to be clearly noted, even though space do not
admit many particulars; because his capacity as administrator at the
head of the Admiralty a few years later has been seriously impugned, by
a criticism both partial and excessive, if not wholly unjust. Nelson, a
witness of his Mediterranean service from beginning to end, lauded to
the utmost the excellence there reached, and attributed most of the
short-coming noted in the later office to the yielding of a man then
advanced in years, to advisers, in trusting whom fully he might well
believe himself warranted by experience.

Although, when taking command, his fleet reached the seemingly large
proportions of twenty-five ships-of-the-line and some fifty cruisers,