ot the result for a single year will somewhat
astonish these modern economists. But if all the expenditures of this
nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual
"war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text
might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! But
could any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of
maintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be
abolished?

If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure
justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the
means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures
commensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon
the "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers
of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the
world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its
requisitions?

The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in
the further discussion of this subject.

It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend
with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes.

To this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument
ends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution,
I apply to the court,--that is, to _legal_ force,--to compel him to do
me justice. So nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when all
other means fail to prevent aggression and injury.

But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent
repeated and continued aggression.

So does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less
proper and just on that account.

But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the
guilty triumph.

So it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimes
permits the wicked to triumph for a season.

But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war
is unjust on both sides.

So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both
resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends.

But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle
their differences.

For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--a
congress of nations, as it has been called,--would be more productive
of ev