non at Spandau." The works on the three
great lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly
repaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in
check the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till the
newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could
re-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting
by the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great
defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily
surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who
commanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established
in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau,
Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. "Spandau," said he in the 19th Bulletin, "is an
inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of
operations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had
not even armed its batteries." The possession of these fortifications
inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their
influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.

These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of
Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they
effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the
flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a
decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of
Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from
profiting by the advantages of his position.

The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular
campaigns has often been alluded to by historians. Those works which had
been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities,
contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had
been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to
fetter and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa,
Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and
defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by
compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did
much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.

The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in
furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into
the enemy's territory, has already been noticed. If thes