on of the craft, which refers to the initiation of
non-residents. The subject has been left untouched; and as the ancient and
universally acknowledged authorities of Masonry have neglected to
legislate on the subject, it is now too late for any modern and local
authority, like that of a Grand Lodge, to do so.

A Grand Lodge may, it is true, forbid--as Missouri, South Carolina,
Georgia, and several other Grand Lodges have done--the initiation of
non-residents, within its own jurisdiction, because this is a local law
enacted by a local authority; but it cannot travel beyond its own
territory, and prescribe the same rule to another Grand Lodge, which may
not, in fact, be willing to adopt it.

The conclusions, then, at which we arrive no this subject are these: The
ancient constitutions have prescribed no regulation on the subject of the
initiation of non-residents; it is, therefore, optional with every Grand
Lodge, whether it will or will not suffer such candidates to be made
within its own jurisdiction; the making, where it is permitted, is legal,
and the candidate so made becomes a regular Mason, and is entitled to the
right of visitation.

What, then, is the remedy, where a person of bad character, and having, in
the language of the Grand Lodge of Maryland, "a distrust of his
acceptance" at home, goes abroad and receives the degrees of Masonry? No
one will deny that such a state of things is productive of great evil to
the craft. Fortunately, the remedy is simple and easily applied. Let the
lodge, into whose jurisdiction he has returned, exercise its power of
discipline, and if his character and conduct deserve the punishment, let
him be expelled from the Order. If he is unworthy of remaining in the
Order, he should be removed from it at once; but if he is worthy of
continuing in it, there certainly can be no objection to his making use of
his right to visit.

Chapter II.

Of the Rights of Entered Apprentices.

In an inquiry into the rights of Entered Apprentices, we shall not be much
assisted by the Ancient Constitutions, which, leaving the subject in the
position in which usage had established it, are silent in relation to what
is the rule. In all such cases, we must, as I have frequently remarked
before, in settling the law, have recourse to analogy, to the general
principles of equity, and the dictates of common sense, and, with these
three as our guides, we shall find but little difficulty in coming