Mason has been tried by the courts of his country on an
indictment for larceny, or any other infamous crime, and been convicted by
the verdict of a jury, although neither the judge nor the jury, nor the
witnesses were Masons, no lodge after such conviction would permit him to
retain his membership, but, on the contrary, it would promptly and
indignantly expel him from the Brotherhood. If, however, the lodge should
refuse to expel him, on the ground that his conviction before the court
was based on the testimony of non-masonic witnesses, and should grant him
a lodge trial for the same offense, then, on the principle against which
we are contending, the evidence of these witnesses as "profanes" would be
rejected, and the party be acquitted for want of proof; and thus the
anomalous and disgraceful spectacle would present itself--of a felon
condemned and punished by the laws of his country for an infamous crime,
acquitted and sustained by a lodge of Freemasons.

But we will be impressed with the inexpediency and injustice of this
principle, when we look at its operation from another point of view. It is
said to be a bad rule that will not work both ways; and, therefore, if the
testimony of non-masonic witnesses against the accused is rejected on the
ground of inadmissibility, it must also be rejected when given in his
favor. Now, if we suppose a case, in which a Mason was accused before his
lodge of having committed an offense, at a certain time and place, and, by
the testimony of one or two disinterested persons, he could establish what
the law calls an _alibi_, that is, that at that very time he was at a
far-distant place, and could not, therefore, have committed the offense
charged against him, we ask with what show of justice or reason could such
testimony be rejected, simply because the parties giving it were not
Masons? But if the evidence of a "profane" is admitted in favor of the
accused, rebutting testimony of the same kind cannot with consistency be
rejected; and hence the rule is determined that in the trial of Masons, it
is competent to receive the evidence of persons who are not Masons, but
whose competency, in other respects, is not denied.

It must, however, be noted, that the testimony of persons who are not
Masons is not to be given as that of Masons is, within the precincts of
the lodge. They are not to be present at the trial; and whatever testimony
they have to adduce, must be taken by a committee, to be