e place for his derelictions of duty during the term of his
suspension. Then, the lodge may again suspend him for a still longer
period, or altogether expel him, if it finds him deserving such
punishment. But in the name of justice, law, and common sense, do not
insiduously and unmanfully continue a sentence for one and a former
offense, as a punishment for another and a later one, and that, too,
without the due forms of trial.

Let us, in this case, go again for an analogy to the laws of the land.
Suppose an offender had been sentenced to an imprisonment of six months
for a larceny, and that while in prison he had committed some new crime.
When the six months of his sentence had expired, would the Sheriff feel
justified, or even the Judge who had sentenced him, in saying: "I will not
release you; you have guilty of another offense during your
incarceration, and therefore, I shall keep you confined six months
longer?" Certainly not. The Sheriff or the Judge who should do so
high-handed a measure, would soon find himself made responsible for the
violation of private rights. But the course to be pursued would be, to
arrest him for the new offense, give him a fair trial, and, if convicted
again, imprison or otherwise punish him, according to his new sentence,
or, if acquitted, discharge him.

The same course should be pursued with a Mason whose conduct during the
period of his suspension has been liable to reproach or suspicion. Masons
have rights as well as citizens--every one is to be considered innocent
until he is proved guilty--and no one should suffer punishment, even of
the lightest kind, except after an impartial trial by his peers.

But the case of an indefinite suspension is different. Here no particular
time has been appointed for the termination of the punishment. It may be
continued during life, unless the court which has pronounced it think
proper to give a determinate period to what was before indeterminate, and
to declare that on such a day the suspension shall cease, and the offender
be restored. In a case of this kind, action on the part of the lodge is
necessary to effect a restoration.

Such a sentence being intended to last indefinitely--that is to say,
during the pleasure of the lodge--may, I conceive, be reversed at any
legal time, and the individual restored by a mere majority vote the of
lodge. Some authorities think a vote of two-thirds necessary; but I see no
reason why a lodge may not, in thi