SUBJECTED TO
ANY POSSIBLE TOXIC EFFECTS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
ANY SUCH EFFECTS ACTUALLY EXIST. FARRELL AND HIS ORGANIZATION HAVE ALL
AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT."

General Farrell arrived in Yokohama on 30 August, with the Commanding
General of the 8th Army; Colonel Warren, who was Chief of the
Radiological Division of the District, arrived on 7 September. The
main body of the investigating group followed later. Preliminary
inspections of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were made on 8-9 and 13-14
September, respectively. Members of the press had been enabled to
precede General Farrell to Hiroshima.

The special groups spent 16 days in Nagasaki and 4 days in Hiroshima,
during which time they collected as much information as was possible
under their directives which called for a prompt report. After General
Farrell returned to the U.S. to make his preliminary report, the groups
were headed by Brigadier General J. B. Newman, Jr. More extensive
surveys have been made since that time by other agencies who had more
time and personnel available for the purpose, and much of their
additional data has thrown further light on the effects of the
bombings. This data has been duly considered in the making of this
report.

PROPAGANDA

On the day after the Hiroshima strike, General Farrell received
instructions from the War Department to engage in a propaganda campaign
against the Japanese Empire in connection with the new weapon and its
use against Hiroshima. The campaign was to include leaflets and any
other propaganda considered appropriate. With the fullest cooperation
from CINCPAC of the Navy and the United States Strategic Air Forces, he
initiated promptly a campaign which included the preparation and
distribution of leaflets, broadcasting via short wave every 15 minutes
over radio Saipan and the printing at Saipan and distribution over the
Empire of a Japanese language newspaper which included the description
and photographs of the Hiroshima strike.

The campaign proposed:

1. Dropping 16,000,000 leaflets in a period of 9 days on 47 Japanese
cities with population of over 100,000. These cities represented more
than 40% of the total population.

2. Broadcast of propaganda at regular intervals over radio Saipan.

3. Distribution of 500,000 Japanese language newspapers containing
stories and pictures of the atomic bomb attacks.

The campaign continued until the Japanese began their