welfare of mankind.

1. Against such as would commit offences upon the property or persons
of men, without law and contrary to the form of law,--against common
criminals of all denominations. Against such it is a sword--to resist
and punish.

2. Against such as would commit offences upon the property or persons
of men, with the form of law and by means of its machinery,--against
unjust legislators, corrupt Judges, and wicked magistrates; against
such it is a shield defending the public head.

In all the States of Anglo-Saxon origin there are two great popular
institutions--Democratic Legislation and Democratic Administration of
Law.

In the process of its historical development the first has come to the
representative form of democratic legislation,--popular law-making by
a body of sworn delegates met in an Assembly, local or federal,
subject to a constitution, written or only traditional, which is the
People's Power of Attorney, authorizing them to do certain matters and
things pertinent to law-making. These are a Jury of general
Law-makers.

In its process of historical development, the second has also come to
a representative form, that of democratic application of law, popular
law-applying, by a body of sworn delegates, that is a Court, subject
to a constitution and laws, written or only traditional, which are the
People's Power of Attorney authorizing them to do certain matters and
things pertinent to law-applying. These are a Jury of special
Law-appliers.

Neither of them as yet has reached its perfect and ultimate form; both
are still in a state of transition. These two are the most valuable
institutional safeguards against unorganized selfishness in the
community,--against thieves, robbers, murderers, traitors, and the
like; against the organized selfishness which gets into places of
delegated power, and would misuse the Form of law so as to prevent the
People from attaining the Purpose of law.

There is also a body of men intermediate between the two,--the
Law-Explainers, the Judges. Speaking theoretically they are not
ultimately either Law-makers or Law-appliers, yet practically, in
their legitimate function, they certainly have much to do with both
the making and applying of laws. For it is their business, not only
to preside at all trials, and determine many subordinate questions of
mere form to expedite the process, but also from the whole mass of
laws, oral or written, statutes and customs, to se