e being to be instructed either to succour
and relieve any that shall be anyway engaged and in danger, or to
supply and put themselves in the place of those that shall be made
unserviceable; and this order and course to be constantly kept and
observed during the whole time of the battle.

Asked if there are no other forms he says: 'Some forms besides, and
different from this (I know well), have been found prescribed and
practised; as for a fleet which consisteth but of a few ships and
being in fight in an open sea, that it should be brought up to the
battle in one only front, with the chief admiral in the midst of them,
and on each side of him the strongest and best provided ships of the
fleet, who, keeping themselves in as convenient a distance as they
shall be able, are to have a eye and regard in the fight to all the
weaker and worser ships of the party, and to relieve and succour them
upon all occasions, and withal being near the admiral may both guard
him and aptly receive his instructions. And for a numerous fleet they
propound that it should be ordered also (when there is sea-room
sufficient) into one only front, but that the ablest and most warlike
ships should be so stationed as that the agility of the smaller ships
and the strength of the other may be communicated[2] to a mutual
relief, and for the better serving in all occasions either of chase or
charge; to which end they order that all the files of the front that
are to the windwards should be made up of the strongest and best
ships, that so they may the surer and speedier relieve all such of the
weaker ships, being to leewards of them, as shall be endangered or
anyway oppressed by any of the enemy.' All this is a clear echo of De
Chaves and the system which still obtained in all continental
navies. For a large fleet at least Boteler evidently disapproved all
tactics based on the line abreast, and preferred a system of small
groups attacking in line ahead, on Cecil's proposed system. Asked
about the campaign of 1588, he has nothing to tell of any English
formation. Of the crescent order of the Armada he says--and modern
research has fully confirmed his statement--that it was not a battle
order at all, but only a defensive sailing formation 'to keep
themselves together and in company until they might get up to be
athwart Gravelines, which was the rendezvous for their meeting with
the Prince of Parma; and in this regard this their order was
commendable.'