the fleet tactics. The action off
Portland on February 18, 1653, and the ensuing chase of Tromp, marked
the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded
in delivering a severe blow to the Dutch admiral and his convoy, it
must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat
through a want of cohesion between their squadrons. On the 19th and
20th Tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent
or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is
there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[4] On the 25th
the fleet had put into Stokes Bay to refit, and between this time and
March 29 the new orders were produced.[5]
The first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the
'Supplementary Instructions' on p. 99, but in the third, relating to
'general action,' instead of the ships engaging 'according to the
order presented,' as was enjoined in the previous set, 'they are to
endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,' as the order which will
enable them 'to take the best advantage they can to engage with the
enemy.' Article 6 directs that where a flagship is distressed captains
are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy. Article 7
however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward
station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed 'upon severest
punishment,' and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre. Article
9 provides a similar signal for flagships.
Compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less
than revolutionary. But it is by no means certain that they were
so. Here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience
for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and
particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the
air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some
evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at
least on a small scale. The natural presumption therefore is that the
new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps
somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not
universal in the service. A consideration of the men who were
responsible for the change points to the same conclusion. Blake, the
only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval
actions, was ashore disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take
part, at least formally, in
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