appen to descry any fleet at sea which we may probably
know or conjecture designs to oppose, encounter or affront us, I will
first strive to get the wind (if I be to leeward), and so shall the
whole fleet in due order do the like. And when we shall join battle no
ship shall presume to assault the admiral, vice-admiral or
rear-admiral, but only myself, my vice-admiral or rear-admiral, if we
be able to reach them; and the other ships are to match themselves
accordingly as they can, and to secure one another as cause shall
require, not wasting their powder at small vessels or victuallers, nor
firing till they come side to side.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] This was a fleet of forty sail, designed, under colour of securing
the sovereignty of the Seas and protecting commerce against pirates, to
assist Spain as far as possible against the French and Dutch. It never
fought.
PART IV
THE FIRST DUTCH WAR
I. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-52
II. ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR, 1653-54
I
ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-53
INTRODUCTORY
From the foregoing examples it will be seen that at the advent of the
Commonwealth, which was to set on foot so sweeping a revolution in the
naval art, all attempts to formulate a tactical system had been
abandoned. This is confirmed by the following extract from the orders
issued by the Long Parliament in 1648. It was the time when the revolt
of a part of the fleet and a rising in the South Eastern counties led
the government to apprehend a naval coalition of certain foreign
powers in favour of Charles. It is printed by Granville Penn in his
_Memorials of Sir William Penn_ as having been issued in 1647,
but the original copy of the orders amongst the Penn Tracts (_Sloane
MSS._ 1709, f. 55) is marked as having been delivered on May 2,
1648, to 'Captain William Penn, captain of the Assurance frigate and
rear-admiral of the Irish Squadron.' They are clearly based on the
later precedents of Charles I, but it must be noted that Penn is told
'to expect more particular instructions' in regard to the fighting
article. We may assume therefore that the admiralty authorities
already recognised the inadequacy of the established fighting
instructions, and so soon as the pressure of that critical time
permitted intended to amplify them.
Amongst those responsible for the orders however there is no name that
can be credited with advanced views. They we
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