leet and so gain the wind of part of it seems to be exactly
what the new instruction contemplated, while its remarkable provision
for a containing movement seems designed to prevent the disastrous
confusion that ensued after the Dutch line had been broken. This
undoubtedly is the great merit of the new instruction, and it is the
first time, so far as is known, that the principle of containing was
ever enunciated. In this it compares favourably with everything we
know of until Nelson's famous memorandum. Its relations to Rodney's
and Howe's manoeuvres for breaking the line must be considered
later. For the present it will suffice to note that it seems designed
rather as a method of gaining the wind than as a method of
concentration, and that the initiation of the manoeuvre is left to the
discretion of the leading flag officer, and cannot be signalled by the
commander-in-chief.
As to the date at which these three 'Further Instructions' were first
drawn up there is some difficulty. It is possible that they were not
entirely new in 1672, but that their origin, at least in design, went
back to the close of the Second War. In Spragge's first 'Sea Book'
there is another copy of them identical except for a few verbal
differences with those in the second 'Sea Book.' In the first 'Sea
Book' they appear on the back of a leaf containing some 'Sailing
Instructions by the Duke of York,' which are dated November 16, 1666,
and this is the latest date in the book. Moreover in this copy they
are headed 'Additional Instructions to be observed in the next
engagement,' as though they were the outcome of a previous
action. Now, as Wren died on June 10 (o.s.), and the battle of
Solebay, the first action of the Third War, was fought on May 28
(o.s.), it is pretty clear that it must have been the Second War and
not the Third that was in Spragge's mind at the time. Still if we have
to put them as early as November 1666 it leaves the question much
where it was. Besides the idea of containing the main body of the
enemy after cutting off part of his fleet, the death penalty for
firing over the line is obviously designed to meet certain regrettable
incidents known to have occurred in the Four Days' Battle. Nor is
there any evidence that they were used in the St. James's fight of
July 25, and as this was the last action in the war fought, the 'next
engagement' did not take place till the Third War. It is fairly clear
therefore that we must regard t
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