preservation, if necessary, of his
own army or part of it) to which the sole, or even the main, inducement
was--our interests contra-distinguished from those of that Ally;--a
General and a Ministry whose policy would be comprehensive enough to
perceive that the true welfare of Britain is best promoted by the
independence, freedom, and honour of other Nations; and that it is only
by the diffusion and prevalence of these virtues that French Tyranny can
be ultimately reduced; or the influence of France over the rest of
Europe brought within its natural and reasonable limits.

If this attempt be 'above the strain and temper' of the country, there
remains only a plan laid down upon the other principles; namely, service
(as far as is required) in _things_ rather than in men; that is, men
being secondary to things. It is not, I fear, possible that the moral
sentiments of the British Army or Government should accord with those of
Spain in her present condition. Commanding power indeed (as hath been
said), put forth in the repulse of the common enemy, would tend, more
effectually than any thing save the prevalence of true wisdom, to
prevent disagreement, and to obviate any temporary injury which the
moral spirit of the Spaniards might receive from us: at all events--such
power, should there ensue any injury, would bring a solid compensation.
But from a middle course--an association sufficiently intimate and wide
to scatter every where unkindly passions, and yet unable to attain the
salutary point of decisive power--no good is to be expected. Great would
be the evil, at this momentous period, if the hatred of the Spaniards
should look two ways. Let it be as steadily fixed upon the French, as
the Pilot's eye upon his mark. Military stores and arms should be
furnished with unfailing liberality: let Troops also be supplied; but
let these act separately,--taking strong positions upon the coast, if
such can be found, to employ twice their numbers of the Enemy; and,
above all, let there be floating Armies--keeping the Enemy in constant
uncertainty where he is to be attacked. The peninsula frame of Spain and
Portugal lays that region open to the full shock of British warfare. Our
Fleet and Army should act, wherever it is possible, as parts of one
body--a right hand and a left; and the Enemy ought to be made to feel
the force of both.

But--whatever plans be adopted--there can be no success, unless the
execution be entrusted to Generals