arn that this opinion is
not supported by any body of _facts_ (for of facts only three are given;
and those, as we shall see, misrepresented); but solely by the weight of
Sir John Moore's personal authority. This being the case, it becomes the
more important to assign the value of that authority, by making such
deductions from the present public estimate of it, as are either fairly
to be presumed from his profession and office, or directly inferred from
the letters under consideration.

As reasons for questioning _a priori_ the impartiality of these
letters,--it might be suggested (in reference to what they would be
likely to _omit_)--first--that they are the letters of a _soldier_; that
is, of a man trained (by the prejudices of his profession) to despise,
or at least to rate as secondary, those resources which for Spain must
be looked to as supreme;--and, secondly, that they are the letters of a
_general_; that is, of a soldier removed by his rank from the
possibility of any extensive intercourse with the lower classes;
concerning whom the question chiefly was. But it is more important to
remark (in reference to what they would be likely to
_mis-state_)--thirdly--that they are the letters of a
_commander-in-chief_; standing--from the very day when he took the
field--in a dilemma which compelled him to risk the safety of his army
by advancing, or its honour by retreating; and having to make out an
apology, for either issue, to the very persons who had imposed this
dilemma upon him.--The reader is requested to attend to this. Sir John
Moore found himself in Leon with a force 'which, if united,' (to quote
his own words) 'would not exceed 26,000 men.' Such a force, after the
defeat of the advanced armies,--he was sure--could effect nothing; the
best result he could anticipate was an inglorious retreat. That he
should be in this situation at the very opening of the campaign, he saw,
would declare to all Europe that somewhere there must be blame: but
where? with himself he knew that there was none: the English Government
(with whom he must have seen that at least a part of the blame lay--for
sending him so late, and with a force so lamentably incommensurate to
the demands of the service) it was not for him--holding the situation
that he did--openly to accuse (though, by implication, he often does
accuse them); and therefore it became his business to look to the
Spaniards; and, in their conduct, to search for palliations of