consider at all
carefully the facts hinted at in my last article--too complex to be more
than hinted at in the space available--will realize that the "isolation"
of America is an illusion of the map, and is becoming more so every day;
that she is an integral part of Occidental civilization whether she
wishes it or not, and that if civilization in Europe takes the wrong
turn we Americans would suffer less directly but not less vitally than
France or Britain or Germany.
All this, of course, is no argument for departing from our traditional
isolation. Our entrance into the welter might not change things or it
might change them for the worse or the disadvantages might be such as to
outweigh the advantages. The sensible question for America is this: "Can
we affect the general course of events in Europe--in the world, that
is--to our advantage by entering in; and will the advantage of so doing
be of such extent as to offset the risks and costs?"
Before answering that question I want to indicate by very definite
proposals or propositions a course of action and a basis for estimating
the effect. I will put the proposal with reference to America's future
attitude to Europe in the form of a definite proposition thus:
That America shall use her influence to secure the abandonment
by the powers of Christendom of rival group alliances and the
creation instead of an alliance of all the civilized powers
having as its aim some common action--not necessarily
military--which will constitute a collective guarantee of each
against aggression.
Thus when Germany, asked by the Allies at the prospective peace to
remove the menace of her militarism by reducing her armaments, replies,
"What of my protection against Russia?" Christendom should, with
America's help, be in a position to reply: "We will all protect you
against Russia, just as we would all protect Russia against you."
The considerations which support such a policy on America's part are
mainly these: First, that if America does not lend the assistance of her
detachment from European quarrels to such an arrangement, Europe of
herself may not prove capable of it. Second, that if Europe does not
come to some such arrangement the resulting unrest, militarism, moral
and material degeneration, for the reasons above indicated and for
others to be indicated presently, will most unfavorably affect the
development of America, and expose her to dangers in
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