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itions._ The writers, and editors, of the Logical text-books which run in the ordinary grooves----to whom I shall hereafter refer by the (I hope inoffensive) title "The Logicians"----take, on this subject, what seems to me to be a more humble position than is at all necessary. They speak of the Copula of a Proposition "with bated breath", almost as if it were a living, conscious Entity, capable of declaring for itself what it chose to mean, and that we, poor human creatures, had nothing to do but to ascertain _what_ was its sovereign will and pleasure, and submit to it. pg166 In opposition to this view, I maintain that any writer of a book is fully authorised in attaching any meaning he likes to any word or phrase he intends to use. If I find an author saying, at the beginning of his book, "Let it be understood that by the word '_black_' I shall always mean '_white_', and that by the word '_white_' I shall always mean '_black_'," I meekly accept his ruling, however injudicious I may think it. And so, with regard to the question whether a Proposition is or is not to be understood as asserting the existence of its Subject, I maintain that every writer may adopt his own rule, provided of course that it is consistent with itself and with the accepted facts of Logic. Let us consider certain views that may _logically_ be held, and thus settle which of them may _conveniently_ be held; after which I shall hold myself free to declare which of them _I_ intend to hold. The _kinds_ of Propositions, to be considered, are those that begin with "some", with "no", and with "all". These are usually called Propositions "in _I_", "in _E_", and "in _A_". First, then, a Proposition in _I_ may be understood as asserting, or else as _not_ asserting, the existence of its Subject. (By "existence" I mean of course whatever kind of existence suits its nature. The two Propositions, "_dreams_ exist" and "_drums_ exist", denote two totally different kinds of "existence". A _dream_ is an aggregate of ideas, and exists only in the _mind of a dreamer_: whereas a _drum_ is an aggregate of wood and parchment, and exists in _the hands of a drummer_.) First, let us suppose that _I_ "asserts" (i.e. "asserts the existence of its Subject"). Here, of course, we must regard a Proposition in _A_ as making the _same_ assertion, since it necessarily _contains_ a Proposition in _I_.
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