Disamis_, _Datisi_, _Felapton_, and
_Fresison_.

Some of "The Logicians" will, no doubt, be ready to reply "But we are
not _Aldrichians_! Why should _we_ be responsible for the validity of
the Syllogisms of so antiquated an author as Aldrich?"

Very good. Then, for the _special_ benefit of these "friends" of mine
(with what ominous emphasis that name is sometimes used! "I must have a
private interview with _you_, my young _friend_," says the bland Dr.
Birch, "in my library, at 9 a.m. tomorrow. And you will please to be
_punctual_!"), for their _special_ benefit, I say, I will produce
_another_ charge against this "non-existential" interpretation.

It actually invalidates the ordinary Process of "Conversion", as applied
to Proposition in '_I_'.

_Every_ logician, Aldrichian or otherwise, accepts it as an established
fact that "Some x are y" may be legitimately converted into "Some y are
x."

But is it equally clear that the Proposition "If there _were_ any x,
some of them _would_ be y" may be legitimately converted into "If there
_were_ any y, some of them would be x"? I trow not.

The example I have already used----of a Boys' School with a non-existent
First Class----will serve admirably to illustrate this new flaw in the
theory of "The Logicians."
pg171
Let us suppose that there is yet _another_ Rule in this School, viz. "In
each Class, at the end of the Term, the head boy and the second boy
shall receive prizes."

This Rule entirely authorises us to assert (in the sense in which "The
Logicians" would use the words) "Some boys in the First Class will
receive prizes", for this simply means (according to them) "If there
_were_ any boys in the First Class, some of them _would_ receive
prizes."

Now the Converse of this Proposition is, of course, "Some boys, who will
receive prizes, are in the First Class", which means (according to "The
Logicians") "If there _were_ any boys about to receive prizes, some of
them _would_ be in the First Class" (which Class we know to be _empty_).

Of this Pair of Converse Propositions, the first is undoubtedly _true_:
the second, _as_ undoubtedly, _false_.

It is always sad to see a batsman knock down his own wicket: one pities
him, as a man and a brother, but, as a _cricketer_, one can but
pronounce him "Out!"

We see, then, that, among all the conceivable views we have here
considered, there are only _two_ w