n the tropical region.

This is a chance which is common to limited and to total secession, but
which is still more unavoidable in the last. Face to face with the
miserable Confederacy of the extreme South, the United States can afford
to be patient; face to face with the Confederacy comprising all the
slave States, (or, which means the same, face to face with two distinct
Confederacies, comprising, the one the cotton States, the other the
border States, yet united against the North through an old instinct of
complicity,) the attitude of the United States, as every one foresees,
will inevitably be more hostile. Total secession itself can be born only
from a sentiment of declared hostility; it amounts to a declaration of
war. Suppose that Mr. Lincoln rejects the advice of those of his cabinet
who would incline to accept the fact of separation; suppose that, while
treating the South with gentleness, and striving to spare it the horrors
of an armed strife, he persists in protecting the rights of the
Confederation, and securing to it, by a maritime blockade, the
collection of taxes; suppose that the blockade is organized from South
Carolina to the Rio Grande, supported by Forts Pickens, Jefferson, and
Taylor, which will have been revictualled at all costs after the forced
evacuation of Fort Sumter; suppose that, in this manner, watch is kept
over the ports of Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, may it
not happen that the insurrectional government at Montgomery will decide
to effect a march on Washington? Is it not probable that North Carolina,
Virginia, and Maryland will allow themselves to be crossed without
saying a word? More than this, are we not justified in believing that
these States, and with them a considerable number of the central ones,
rallied around their ancient banner by the very approach of peril, will
make common cause with the slave Confederacy? In such a case, how avert
the chances of a direful conflict? Will the United States carry patience
with respect to the aggressors, the fear of giving a signal of ruin,
deference to the counsels lavished on them perhaps, so far as to refuse
to return a violent attack, and to consent to the ravishment of their
capital? It is hard to believe. If the South make the attack, the war
will break out, and the border States will be exposed to the first blow.

But admit that they succeed in preventing an immediate explosion, the
mere fact of a total secession, and