ement. The least menace against the
blockade is worth as much to us as the despatch of an army." Is it not
to mock at people, in the face of so new a position, of a war in which
one of the parties, though he does not fail to boast of his strength and
his resources, counts in fact, before every thing, upon European
support, to propound fine theories in accordance with which the
transportation of despatches sent from a neutral port and destined for a
neutral country, would not be contrary to neutrality, _because these
despatches could not increase the military advantages of either of the
belligerents?_

It has been sought to assimilate mail packets to vessels of war, and
consequently to except them from the exercise of the right of search.
The pretence is so ill-founded that it falls to the ground upon
examination. Who does not feel that the presence of a lieutenant of the
royal navy or the color of a uniform is not sufficient to constitute a
vessel of war or a transport?

It is asked whether other packets, which have carried ministers sent by
the United States to Europe, have not also infringed the rules of
neutrality? It is possible, but this does not concern us. Supposing that
the mission of these ministers in Europe, where they are regularly
accredited like their predecessors to the different governments, and
where they have no support, no new act, no violation of the blockade to
demand, may be assimilated to the mission of the Southern delegates;
supposing that their letters of credit bear some analogy to the
despatches intrusted to Messrs. Mason and Slidell, it belonged in any
case to the Southern cruisers to stop and search the packets in which
they had taken passage. The powerlessness of one of the belligerents
could not impose on the other the duty of abstaining in like manner.

Resting next on the diplomatic quality of the Southern envoys, it has
been attempted to insinuate that their mission was purely a civil one.
Not only did the diplomatic character not exist, since it had had no
recognition, but the Southern Commissioners were expressly charged
with, procuring to the armies of slavery the most essential assistance
which they could receive in view of military success and strategy. Their
success, by ensuring the breaking of the blockade, would alone have been
worth more to them than the winning of several battles. I say nothing,
moreover, of the shipments of arms and ammunition which they would have
doubtl